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CHAPTER I . INTRODUCTION
There are many ways of achieving a settlement of an in-
ternational commercial dispute: mediation, conciliation, ar-
bitration and litigation. Today, one of the most popular
ways of settling an international commercial dispute is ar-
bitration. This form of dispute resolution has been known
to humanity for many centuries. Today, international com-
mercial arbitration has developed during this century. It
has evolved: in the beginning it was used only for tradi-
tional commercial transactions, such as sale of goods. Cur-
rently it is widely used in deciding many other types of
commercial disputes. Together with its development, arbi-
Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 195 8
1 (1981) .
E.g. Michael John Mustil, Arbitration: History and Back-
ground, 6 J. Int'l Arb. 1 43 (1989) ("Commercial arbitration
must have existed since the dawn of commerce."); Gabriel M.
Wilner, Acceptance of Arbitration by Developing Countries,
in Resolving Transnational Disputes Trough International Arbitration,
283 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1984) ("Arbitration is one
of the generic types of techniques for the settlement of
disputes; it has been employed over as long a period of time
as the oldest judicial system.")
Rene David, Arbitration in International Trade 1 (1985) .
Martin Domke, Domke on Commercial Arbitration (the Law and Practice of
Commercial Arbitration) 8 (Gabriel M. Wilner ed.
,
1996) .
1
2tration has shown its clear advantages over litigation and
other forms of dispute settlement.
Arbitration's main advantage over litigation is that
using a foreign court may be a disadvantage to a party to a
commercial agreement because of the party's unf amiliarity
with the national laws, procedures and even differences in
mentality and cultural perspectives. Parties to arbitration
are free to choose their own "judges", applicable law and
procedural laws. Moreover arbitration is a private proceed-
ing which enables the parties to keep it confidential. Also
commercial arbitration is more "flexible and adaptable and
as a result quicker and more efficient than litigation."
Arbitration has been described as a positive way to solve
arising disputes particularly if the parties want to con-
Q
tinue in the future their business relationship.
E.g. Berg, supra note 1, at 1, Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter,
Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration 22 (2d ed.
1991)
.
E.g. Berg, supra note 1, at 1, Howard M. Holtzman and Joseph E.
Newhaus, A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration: Legislative History and Commentary 3 (1989) .
E.g. Redfern & Hunter, supra note 5, at 23, Holtzman, su-
pra note 6, at 3 ("... relative simplicity, economy, speed
and privacy, . .") , Note, Mitsubishi : the Erosion of the New
York Convention and international Arbitration, 3 Wiscon.
Int'l L. J. 151, 154 (1984) ("... arbitration offers the ad-
ditional advantages of speed, economy, and uniformity, and
it is comparably less intrusive")
.
James E. Meason and Alison G. Smith, Non-Lawyers in Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration: Gathering Splinters of the
The main advantage over mediation or conciliation is
that the they do not result in a binding or enforceable
award. In contrast with arbitration, which is based on a
voluntary agreement of the parties to submit future disputes
to a binding arbitration, these two alternative dispute
resolution forms may be used between parties as a possible
first step in order to solve disputes before resorting to
arbitration.
Nevertheless, arbitration has a number of weaknesses,
which may be pointed out: limited powers of the arbitral
tribunal and impossibility to bring multi-party disputes to-
gether. It is also necessary to mention that currently
costs and speed of arbitral proceeding can be very high.
Bench, 12 Nw.J. Int'l L. & Bus. 24 (1991) ("... arbitration
is seen as providing the best chance to save the underlying
business relationship."); Note, supra note 7, at 154
("Business people generally prefer arbitration to court
litigation because it fosters smooth business relations and
is more conducive than litigation to maintaining cooperation
and goodwill.")
.
E.g. Redfern & Hunter, supra note 5, at 12, Domke , supra
note 4 , at 8
.
Domke, supra note 4, at 3.
Redfern & Hunter, supra note 5, at 2 5; Julian C. Chu,
Consolidation of Arbitral Proceedings and International Com-
mercial Arbitration, 7 J. Int'l Arb . 2 53 (1990) ("Although
it has achieved wide acceptance as the preferred alternative
to litigation, international commercial arbitration is still
considered inferior in certain situations, such as when dis-
putes involve multiple parties.)
.
4All these and many other advantages of the interna-
tional commercial arbitration will not make sense if the
winning party will not receive the performance of the award.
It is implied that once the parties have agreed to the bind-
ing character of arbitration then they will carry out the
performance voluntarily. However, when the losing party
fails to perform the award the winning party will need to
enforce the performance. Efficiency of the international
commercial arbitration is highly dependable on the possibil-
ity of the enforcement of the rendered award. ' Enforcement
can be possible if a "necessary legal framework can be in-
Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, International Arbitration Law 5 03-504
(1990) .
Redfern & Hunter, supra note 5, at 416.
Martin Hunter, Judicial Assistance for the Arbitrator,
in: Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration 195, 2 03
(Julian D.M. Lew ed., 1987) ("However, it is suggested that
this so called "voluntary" performance is largely illusory.
Most practitioners who advise clients would confirm that, in
a huge majority of cases, the losing party is thoroughly ag-
grieving and wants to know how he can escape from complying
with the award.")
Redfern & Hunter, supra note 5, at 417
E.g. Albert Jan van den Berg, Some Recent Problems in the
practice of Enforcement under the New York and ICSID Conven-
tions, 2 ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal, 43 9
(1988) ( "Effectiveness of international arbitration depends
ultimately on the questions whether the arbitral award can
be enforced against loosing party.); Michel Gaudet, The En-
forcement of Awards Relating to International Trade, in ICCA
Congress Series n 6: International Arbitration in a Changing World 2 03
ternationally secured." 1 Although some countries have do-
mestic laws on the enforcement of awards rendered in other
countries, most foreign awards are governed by bilateral and
multilateral conventions. Multilateral conventions and
treaties are a more effective method of creation of an in-
ternational system of law rather than bilateral treaties,
which are limited only to two countries. Such an multilat-
eral legal framework is the 1958 United Nations Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award
19(hereinafter the New York Convention or Convention) . It
2has been referred as one of the major pieces of the legal
(Albert Jan van den Berg ed. , 1993) ("The enforcement of the
award is the key to the effectiveness of arbitration.")
.
Berg, supra note 1.
1
8
Redfern & Hunter, supra note 5, at 60-61.
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330
U.N.T.S. 38.
20 E.g. Berg, supra note 1, at 1 (". . . the most important
Convention in the field of arbitration and as the corner-
stone of current international commercial arbitration."); 2
Pieter Sanders, The New York Convention, in International
Commercial Arbitration 293 (Pieter Sanders ed. 1960) ("...an im-
portant step forward."); Rubino-Samartano, supra note 12, at
30 ("...made arbitration a more effective instrument for
solving disputes."); Ottoarndt Glossner, The New York Con-
vention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards - Some Thoughts After 30 Years - 1958-1988 , in ICCA
Congress Series N4 : Arbitration in Settlement of International Commercial
Disputes Involving the Far East and Arbitration in Combined Transportation
275 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1988) ("...the New York Convention
. . . has established "comity" . .
.) ; Daniel M. Kolkey, Attack-
ing Arbitral Awards: Rights of Appeal and Review in Interna-
6framework of international commercial arbitration, and it
deals with the essential two aspects of international com-
mercial arbitration: arbitration agreement and foreign arbi-
tral awards. The Convention has currently one hundred and
twelve contracting states.
The New York Convention has been the cornerstone of the
present system of the international enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards by the contracting states for almost forty
years. During these years the treaty has shown its effi-
ciency in terms of enforcing foreign arbitral awards in na-
tional courts. Nevertheless, there are a number of prob-
lems in this field, especially with the enforcement of the
rendered awards in the national courts.
The primary objective of this research will be to show
the proposals that have been made in order to amend the New
York Convention. Through these proposals the paper's author
tional Arbitration, 22 Int'l Law. 693 (1988) ("...the pre-
eminent treaty governing the enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards..."); Note, supra note 7, at 152 ("The New York Con-
vention is the primary arbitration treaty having global ef-
fects") .
Glossner, supra note 20, at 275.
UNCITRAL Home Page, Status of Conventions (last modified
Feb. 5, 1997) <http://www.un.or.at/uncitral/status/index.
htm#T0P>.
Mustil, supra note 2, at 43 notes that the Convention
"perhaps could easy claim to be the most effective instance
of international legislation in the entire history of com-
mercial law" .
7will try to analyze the problems that the proposed modifica-
tions seek to eliminate. In general these proposals were
aimed at amending the Convention in order to widen the scope
of application of the Convention and to eliminate the diffi-
culties with the enforcement of arbitral awards in national
courts
.
Chapter two of this paper will give a historical over-
view of the multilateral enforcement conventions prior to
the New York Convention and a brief drafting history of the
New York Convention itself. Chapter three will concentrate
on the provisions referring to the scope of application and
the enforcement scheme of the New York Convention. Chapter
four will deal with the proposals to amend the Convention in
order to eliminate the problems with the enforcement of for-
eign arbitral awards. It will also show the opposing view
to any changes to the present system.
Finally, the paper will conclude that even though the
proposals to amend the Convention are aimed at making the
enforcement system work more efficiently, nevertheless the
magnitude of the problems is not enough to undertake modifi-
cations. Any modification would only create uncertainty and
additional problems especially today when the Convention has
been universally accepted. It will be more useful to con-
tinue to harmonize national legislation and court practice
on international commercial arbitration.
CHAPTER II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
At the beginning of this century , in the absence of
multilateral treaties on international commercial arbitra-
tion, the parties involved in arbitration, were forced to
rely on domestic laws. The provisions of these laws were
different from each other and judiciary were usually unfa-
vorable towards arbitration. This, together with the in-
crease of international commercial arbitration induced the
International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, after the W.W.I,
to advocate an international convention in international
commercial arbitration. The main objective of the proposal
was to eliminate the unenforceability of the arbitral
2 6 2 7
clause. The result was the first "modern and genuinely"
international convention adopted in nineteen twenty three
under the auspices of the League of Nations. The 1923 Ge-
2 8
neva Protocal established the validity and enforceability
Jacques Werner, Should the New York Convention be Revised
to Provide for Court Intervention in Arbitral Proceedings?
,
6 J. Int'l Arb. 3 113 (1989).
Berg, supra note 1, at 6.
26
Id.
Redfern & Hunter, supra note 5, at 61.
Protocol on Arbitration Clause, September 24, 1923, 27
L.N.T.S. 258 [hereinafter Protocol].
8
929
of arbitration agreements. The Second step taken by the
League of Nations was adoption of the 1927 Geneva Convention
on the Execution of the Foreign Arbitral Awards. ' The pur-
pose of this convention was to regulate the enforcement of
Protocol awards within the territory of contracting
states. Both the Protocol and the Geneva Convention are
viewed by the commentators as an improvement compared with
29
Id. art 1:
Each of the Contracting states recognizes the va-
lidity of an agreement whether relating to exist-
ing or future differences between parties, subject
respectively to the jurisdiction of different Con-
tracting States by which the parties to a contract
agree to submit to arbitration all or any differ-
ences that may arise in connection with such con-
trol relating to commercial matters or to any
other matter capable of settlement by arbitration,
whether or not the arbitration is to take place in
a country to whose jurisdiction none of the par-
ties is subject. ...
3 Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
September 26, 1927, 52 L.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter Geneva Con-
vention] .
31
Id. art. 1:
In the territories of any High Contracting Party
to which the present Convention applies, an arbi-
tral award made in pursuance of an agreement,
whether relating to existing or future differences
. . . covered by the Protocol on Arbitration Clauses
. . . shall be recognised as binding and shall be
enforced in accordance with the rules of the pro-
cedure of the territory where the award is relied
upon, provided that the said award has been made
in a territory of one of the High Contracting Par-
ties to which the present Convention applies and
between persons who are subject to the jurisdic-
tion of one of the High Contracting Parties. ...
10
the previously existing national regimes. ' Nevertheless,
these conventions had a number of loopholes: the field of
application was limited and the burden of proof of the con-
ditions of the enforcement of the award was on the party
seeking the enforcement. Also the award, in order to be
enforced, had to comply with two requirements. First, was
that the award, in order to obtain the exequatur in the en-
forcement country it was necessary to obtain one in the
country were it was rendered. ' Second, was that arbitra-
tion should have been governed by the law governing arbitra-
tion procedures, which was usually the law of the place of
arbitration.
These "defects" ' prompted the International Chamber of
Commerce to promote a new international convention right af-
ter W.W.II. This proposal was taken up by the United Na-
tions Economic and Social Council, which prepared a draft
and convened a diplomatic conference in New York in 1958.
E.g. Berg, supra note 1, at 7, Redfern & Hunter, supra
note 5, at 62, Werner, supra note 24, at 114.
E.g. Berg, supra note 1, at 7, Werner, supra note, 23 at
114 .
E.g. Rubino-Samartano, supra note 12, at 30, Berg, supra
note 1, at 7 (. . . the award had to become "final" in the
country where it was made . .
.
)
.
E.g. Berg, supra note 1, at 7, Werner, supra note 24 at
114 .
Werner, supra note 24, at 114.
11
The diplomatic conference adopted a new convention, United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
3 7Foreign Arbitral Awards. The New York Convention is con-
sidered as the "most important international treaty relating
to international commercial arbitration."
The New York Convention contains a number of improve-
ments over its predecessors. The field of application of
the New York Convention is broader - it applies to an award
made in any other state, even though the power of the first
3 9
reservation may limit this only to signatory states. A
second improvement is that the burden of proof now lies with
the party against whom the enforcement is sought. Another
improvement is that the double exequatur regime created by
the Geneva Convention is abolished.
New York Convention, supra note 19.
3 8
E.g. Redfern & Hunter, supra note 5, at 63, supra note
20.
Berg, supra note 1, at 9.
40
Id.
Hans Smith and Vratislav Pechota, General Multinational
Conventions , 1 world Arb. Rep. s 11.3, where the authors ex-
plain double exequatur regime as a regime according to which
the claimant had to provide the national court of the en-
forcing country a leave for enforcement (exequatur or the
like) from the national court of the place of arbitration.
13
4 4
or not . " The award may be rendered not only by ad hoc
tribunals, but also by permanent arbitration bodies. The
scope of the Convention does not rely on the nationality of
the parties. It is sufficient that the award be made in
the territory of another State or in the enforcing country
for it to be considered as non-domestic. The Convention
applies only to foreign awards and it does not apply to
awards considered domestic.
Permited Reservations
In order to narrow the scope of the Convention two res-
ervations are permitted: the reciprocity reservation and
44
Id. art. 11(1
Jd. art. 1(2) : "The term "arbitral awards" shall include
not only awards made by arbitrators appointed for each case
but also those made by permanent arbitral bodies to which
the parties have submitted."
Berg, supra note 1, at 15, Smith & Pechota, supra note
41, s 23.0 ("The nationality of the parties ... is irrele-
vant . " )
Yearbook Commercial Arbitration XXI, 4 04 (International
Council for Commercial Arbitration) (1996) [hereinafter 21
Y . B . Comm . Arb
.
]
.
48 Berg, supra note 1, at 19.
New York Convention, supra note 19, art. 1(3)
:
When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Con-
vention, or notifying extensions under article X
hereof, any State may on the basis of reciprocity
declare that it will apply the Convention to the
14
the commercial reservation. The first reservation 50 permits
a Contracting State, on the basis of reciprocity, to apply
the Convention only to the awards made in the territory of
another contracting state. A number of contracting states
have also stated that they will recognize and enforce awards
of non-contracting states, if such a state grant's recipro-
cal treatment. Currently the first reservation has eighty
five contracting states. ' Nevertheless, the first reserva-
tion has less impact " on the applicability of the New York
Convention in view of the large in the number of contracting
states. The second reservation permits the Contracting
recognition and enforcement of awards made only in
the territory of another Contracting State. It
may also declare that it will apply the Convention
only to differences arising out of legal relation-
ships, whether contractual or not, which are con-
sidered as commercial under the national law of
the State making such declaration.
E.g. Redfern & Hunter, supra note 5, at 458
("...qualification to welcome internationalism."); Berg, su-
pra note 1, at 12 (". . .more traditional view. . .")
.
Smith & Pechota, supra note 41, s 23.0. Such a declara-
tion has been made by Belarus, Bulgaria, Cuba, Chech Repub-
lic, Lithuania, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia,
Ukraine and Vietnam.
52 21 Y.B. Comm. Arb
.
, supra note 47, at 3 89.
E.g. Berg, supra note 1 at 13, Sanders, supra note 20, at
305 ("General adherence to the Convention "will narrow" the
field of application of the reservation."); Redfern &
Hunter, supra note 5, at 459, mentioning for the same reason
that "the limited effect of the first reservation should not
be exaggerated."
15
States to reserve the applicability of the Convention only
to such transactions that are considered as commercial under
its own laws. This "commercial reservation" was permited
initially in order to enable certain Civil law countries,
which distinguish between commercial and non commercial
transactions, to become parties to the Convention. ' Cur-
rently forty nine contracting states, including the US and
other common law countries, have made this reservation.
3 . Arbitration Agreement
The Convention's title does not explicitly mention ar-
bitration agreements, however it governs not only recogni-
tion and enforcement of arbitral awards but also arbitration
agreements. Originally this matter was supposed to be regu-
lated by a separate Protocol and only after it was realized
that this is not desirable the arbitration clause was in-
serted in to the New York Convention. ' Without recognition
E.g. Berg, supra note 1, at 51, Sanders, supra note 20,
at 303 mentioning that "the non-adoption would seriously
have hampered the adherence to the Convention of several
States, e.g. Belgium."; Smith & Pechota, supra note 41, s
23.0 underlines that the provision "seeks to accommodate
those legal systems that provide for arbitration only in
matters that are commercial under their law."
55 21 Y.B. Comm. Arb
.
, supra note 47, at 389.
56 Berg, supra note 1, at 56.
16
and enforcement of the primary arbitration agreement their
could not be any enforcement and recognition of the award
rendered according to that arbitration agreement
.
The Convention refers to an arbitration agreement as an
agreement "under which the parties undertake to submit to
arbitration all or any differences" between them. Another
requirement is that the agreement should be in writing.
Also, the agreement should concern "a subject matter capable
of settlement by arbitration," ' and should not be "null
and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed."
B. Enforcement Scheme
1 . Enforcement Procedures
The 1958 New York Convention imposes a general obliga-
tion for a Contracting State to recognize and enforce an ar-
bitral award according to its procedural law together with
complying with the provisions of the said Convention. ' Ac-
New York Convention, supra note 19, art. 11(1)
.
58
Id. art 11(1) and (2) .
C Q
New York Convention, supra note 19, art 11(1)
.
60
Id. art 11(3) .
61
Id. art III:
Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral
awards as binding and enforce them in accordance
17
cording to the Article 3, the forum State should not impose
higher standards on the recognition and enforcement of arbi-
tral awards to which the New York Convention applies than
those it imposes to domestic awards. The perpose of this
provision is to ensure that no additional restrictions are
imposed on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbi-
tral awards by states parties to the Convention.
Few formalities are required to be presented by the
party seeking recognition and enforcement of the award to
the relevant national court. The party seeking the en-
forcement must furnish the national court the original arbi-
tral agreement and award. In circumstances where the origi-
nals are not available, the claimant is permitted to present
with the rules of procedure of the territory where
the award is relied upon, under the conditions
laid down in the following articles. There shall
not be imposed substantially more onerous condi-
tions or higher fees or charges on the recognition
or enforcement of arbitral awards to which this
Convention applies than are imposed on the recog-
nition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.
62
63
Sanders, supra note 20, at 313.
New York Convention, supra note 19, art. IV (1)
:
To obtain the recognition and enforcement men-
tioned in the preceding article, the party apply-
ing for recognition and enforcement shall, at the
time of application, supply:
(a) The duly authenticated original award or
a duly certified copy thereof;
(b) The original agreement referred to in ar-
ticle II or a duly certified copy thereof.
18
certified copies. Moreover, if the award and the agreement
are in a language other than that of the forum, the party
seeking recognition and enforcement is entitled to present
certified translations. ' By complying with these proce-
dures, the claimant has presented prima facie evidence enti-
tling him to obtain enforcement of the award. Generally
the court will grant recognition and enforcement of the
sought award, ' unless it finds grounds for refusal permit-
6 7ted by the Convention.
2 . Defenses Against Enforcement
The Convention identifies a limited number of grounds
64
Id. art. IV(2)
:
If the said award or agreement is not made in an
official language of the country in which the
award is relied upon, the party applying for rec-
ognition and enforcement of the award shall pro-
duce a translation of these documents into such
language. The translation shall be certified by
an official or sworn translator or by diplomatic
or consular agent
.
65
E.g. Sanders, supra note 20, at 313, Berg, supra note 1,
at 247.
Kolkey, supra note 20 mentions that "the beauty of the
New York Convention is that the awards rendered in member
jurisdictions are easily enforced ... subject to narrowly de
fined challenges."
Redfern & Hunter, supra note 5, at 461.
1 9
6 8for refusal of enforcement of arbitral awards. Generally
6 9they may be divided into two major groups: five grounds
that must be furnished by the respondent; and two grounds
that may also be raised by the court on its own motion.
This list is exhaustive - no other ground can be considered
for determining whether enforcement should be granted.
Another feature of these provisions is that the burden of
proof is on the respondent. The respondent is the one who
has to supply evidence of the existence of the grounds for
refusal of the enforcement. ' Furthermore, the Convention
does not permit any review on the merits of the arbitral
award. This generally accepted interpretation of the Con-
vention corresponds to the principle of "international corn-
New York Convention, supra note 19, art. V.
c g
E.g. Redfern & Hunter, supra note 5, at 461; Sanders, su-
pra note 20, at 313, Smith & Pechota, supra note 41, s 2 3.0;
21 Y.B. Comm. Arb
.
, supra note 47, at 4 77.
E.g. id. Redfern & Hunter, Berg, supra note 1, at 264.
E.g. Rubino-Samartano, supra note 12, at 4 96 ("The burden
of proof is neatly placed on the party which intends to op-
pose the recognition and enforcement."); id. Redfern &
Hunter; id. Berg; Georgio Gaja, New York Convention s
I.C.I. (1984)
.
Berg, supra note 1, at 2 64.
E.g. Redfern & Hunter, supra note 5, at 4 61; Berg, supra
note 1, at 265.
20
mercial arbitration that the national courts should not in-
terfere with the substance of the arbitration."
a. Defenses Presented by the Respondent
The first defense that respondent may bring to the at-
tention of the national court is the invalidity of the arbi-
tration agreement. The cause of the invalidity must be
that the parties were under some incapacity. Under the
same provision non-compliance with the requirement of the
article 11(2), concerning the form of the arbitration agree-
ment, may also constitute a ground for refusal. The sec-
ond ground is when "the party against whom the award is in-
voked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the
74
Id. Berg at 269.
New York Convention, supra note 19, art V(5) (a)
:
Recognition and enforcement of the award may be
refused, at the request of the party against whom
it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the
competent authority where the recognition and en-
forcement is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in
article II were, under the law applicable to them,
under some incapacity, or the said agreement is
not valid under the law to which the parties have
subjected it or, failing any indication thereon,
under the law of the country where the award was
made ; or ...
76 Berg, supra note 1, at 2 96.
77
Td.
21
arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was other-
7 8
wise unable to present his case." Commentators from vari-
79 •
ous countries ' in this regard cite the Unite States Second
Circuit Court of Appeals decision, which pointed out that
"this provision essentially sanctioned the application of
the forum State's standards of due process." The third
defense under the New York Convention is the excess by the
8 2
arbitrator of his authority. ' The main concern about this
article is that the courts should not interprete it in such
a way that it would permit them to re-examine the merits of
New York Convention, supra note 19, art V(l) (b)
.
E.g. Berg, supra note 1, at 297 ("This statement states
concisely what Article V(l) (b) is all about,..."); Gaja, supra
note 71, s I.C.3.
8 Parson & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de
L' Industrie du Papier (Rakta) , 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
81 New York Convention, supra note 19 art. V(l) (c)
:
... (c) The award deals with a difference not con-
templated by or not falling within the terms of
the submission to arbitration, or it contains de-
cisions on matters beyond the scope of the submis-
sion to arbitration, or it contains decisions on
matters beyond the scope of the submission to ar-
bitration, provided that, if the decisions on mat-
ters submitted to arbitration can be separated
from those not so submitted, that part of the
award which contains decisions on matters submit-
ted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced;
or ...
82
E.g. Berg, supra note 1, at 311; Redfern & Hunter, supra
note 5, at 462 also charachtarise it as "lack of jurisdic-
tion"; Gaja, supra note 71, s I.C.3 ("Article V(l) refers to
the scope of arbitration agreement")
.
22
the award. The fourth defense is procedural irregulari-
84
ties. The substance of the provision is that if the par-
ties have made an agreement on the matter of the composition
of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure, any pro-
cedural irregularities have to be viewed only under the
8 5
agreement of the parties. The law of the place of arbi-
tration may be taken into consideration only if there is no
other agreement between the parties on this matter. 8 '
The final defense that may be brought up by the respon-
dent is that the "award has not yet become binding on the
parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent
authority of the country in which, or under the law of
87
which, that award was made." The main aim of this proviso
is, along with eliminating the doctrine of double exequator,
not to create a situation where an award, which is not bind-
E.g. Berg, supra note 1, at 322, Redfern & Hunter, supra
note 5, at 463
New York Convention, supra note 19, art. V(l) (d)
:
The composition of the arbitral authority or the
arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties, or, failing such agree-
ment, was not in accordance with the law of the
country where the arbitration took place; or ...
E.g. Berg, supra note 1, at 330 ("The alleged irregular-
ity ... is to be judged under the agreement alone.") ; Gaja,
supra note 71, s I.C.3 ("The arbitral procedure must conform
to the rules set out by the parties independently.")
.
86
Id. Berg at 330.
New York Convention, supra note 19, art V(l) (e)
.
23
ing or is set aside or suspended in the country of origin
would have a binding effect or be granted enforcement in the
country where the enforcement is sought
.
b. Defenses Raised by the Enforcing Court
Besides these five grounds, which may be brought in by
the respondent, the Convention permits two additional
8 9grounds. They may be raised by the parties or the enforc-
9ing forum at its own discretion. The first ground is ar-
bitrability: whether or not this matter is capable of being
solved under the laws of the enforcing country concerning
E.g. Berg, supra note 1, at 357; Gaja, supra note 71, s
I.C. 4.; see also supra note 41 for an explanation of the
double exequator regime;
Q Q
New York Convention, supra note 19, art. V(2)
:
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award
may also be refused if the competent authority in
the country where recognition and enforcement is
sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the differences is not
capable of settlement by arbitration under the law
of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award
would be contrary to the public policy of that
country.
Thomas E. Carronneau, National Law and the Judicializa-
tion of Arbitration: Manifest Destiny, Manifest Disregard or
Manifest Error, in International Arbitration in the 21st Century:
Towards "Judicialization" and Uniformity? 115, 120 (Richard B. Lil-
lich and Charles N. Brower eds
.
, 1994) ("The Convention
nonetheless emphasized the importance of integrity of the
national legal order by allowing the courts of a requested
state to deny enforcement to an award on the basis of the
inarbitrability defense and the public policy exception.")
.
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arbitration. Basically a national court may refuse to en-
force an award rendered by a foreign arbitrator, if the dis-
pute cannot be settled by arbitration under the national
laws in the first place. ' There are diverse views in the
national courts as to what is non arbitrable matter. Com-
mentators view this provision to some extent as a matter in-
volving questions of public policy, because ultimately it is
a matter of public policy what may or may not be arbitrated
under national laws. The second ground for refusal is the
public policy of the enforcing state. This provision may
be viewed as one which delegates the "ultimate decision on
the efficacy of the New York Convention to the good faith of
9 6 9 7the contracting state." However, the national courts
have construed this provision narrowly, reducing the nega-
9
1
New York Convention, supra note 19, art. V(2) (a)
.
92 Ramona Martinez, Recognition and Enforcement of Interna-
tional Arbitral Awards under the United Nations Convention
of 1958: the "Refusal" Provisions, 24 Int'l Law. 4 87, 50 6
(1990) .
9^
Infra note 184
.
E.g. Redfern & Hunter, supra note 5, at 4 6 3; Berg, supra
note 1, at 3 82; Gaja, supra note 71, s I.C.5. ("Two require
ments which are to some extent overlapping.")
.
9 5 New York Convention, supra note 19, art. V(2) (b)
.
96 Martinez, supra note 92, at 508.
97 Infra note 2 00.
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tive impact which could this article have on the effective-
ness of the New York Convention.
E.g. Berg, supra note 1, at 391, but see Note, The Public
Policy Defense to Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Ar-
bitral Awards, 7 Cal . W. Int'l L.J. 228, 228-229 n.l (1977).
CHAPTER IV. PROBLEMS IN PRESENT SYSTEM OF ENFORCEMENT OF AR-
BITRAL AWARDS.
To this day the 1958 United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards is
the most important piece of internationally accepted frame-
work for the enforcement of rendered foreign arbitral
awards. It is one of the few universally accepted multi-
lateral conventions, and currently has 112 member states.
Over the years more than 650 decisions have been reported
from 38 contracting states. National courts of the con-
tracting states have applied the New York Convention to the
"letter and in accordance with its spirit," thus upholding
award enforcement in most cases. ' All this, however,
should not in any event create a false view that the New
9 9 New York Convention, supra note 19.
100 21 Y.B. Comm. Arb., supra note 47, at 3 87.
E.g. Jacques Werner, Conference on the New York Arbitra-
tion Convention, 6 J. Int ' 1 Arb. 1 153 (1989); Berg, supra
note 1, at 3 93 also mentioning that the "courts interpret
and apply the Convention in a manner which is well-disposed
towards international commercial arbitration."
E.g. generally Berg, supra note 1; Gaja, supra note 71;
21 Y.B. Comm. Arb., supra note 47.
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York Convention does not have any problems or difficulties
in its scheme. In particular a number of obstacles in the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards should be mentioned.
First, recourse to the national courts in the enforce-
ment country, in many cases, substantially increases the
length of the enforcement proceeding and the costs related
with it . This is due to the fact that the enforcement court
is usually the national court of the losing party and the
defenses under the New York Convention, under which a party
may oppose the enforcement, are in may instances considered
not narrow enough.
Second, by not regulating procedural aspects of the
international commercial arbitration, the New York Conven-
tion permits the national courts, by using the national law,
to interfere with the arbitration proceedings. ' This not
only undermines the notions of the parties not to deal with
national courts, but may create substantial difficulties in
the future enforcement
.
Third, in many cases a party to a arbitration agreement
is a state agency which tries to invoke sovereign immunity
in order to reject the enforcement of the rendered award.
103 See chapter IV (D) .
104 See chapter IV (C) .
105 See chapter IV (A) and (B) .
See chapter IV (A)
.
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In many countries the judiciary does not even have the power
to enforce rendered arbitral awards against a state en-
tity. The magnitude of this problem has decreased in the
recent years, especially after the collapse of the communist
system of state ownership of enterprises and agencies.
This chapter attempts to analyze this and other diffi-
culties of the New York Convention scheme through the pro-
posals to modify the latter in order to eliminate the men-
tioned problems. Nevertheless, the paper will not only
concentrate on the negative aspects of the current system,
but will also show the opposing view to the proposed amend-
ments and the achievements of the New York Convention.
A. Proposal by the Asian-African Legal Consultative
Committee to Amend the New York Convention.
1. Substance of the Proposal.
The Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee
( "AALCC" ) at its seventeenth session, held at Kuala Lumpur
from June 30 to July 5 1976, adopted a decision proposing to
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL") that it consider the possibility of preparing a
Werner, supra note 101, at 159-160
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protocol to be annexed to the New York Convention. ' The
main idea of the proposed amendment was to assure that na-
tional laws of the place of arbitration or the place where
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award is sought
would not prevent parties from using procedural arbitration
rules that they had freely chosen. At present the lack of
rule creates a number of problems for international commer-
cial arbitrator, who has to deal with the conflict between
Secretariat Note Reporting AALCC Decision, U.N. Doc.
A/CN. 9/127 (1976) [hereinafter Secretariat Note]. The pro-
posal suggested clarification of the following issues:
(a) Where the parties have themselves chosen the
arbitration rules for settling their disputes, the
arbitration proceedings should be conducted pursu-
ant to those rules notwithstanding provisions to
the contrary in the law applicable to the arbitral
procedure and the award rendered should be recog-
nized and enforced by Contracting States to the
195 8 New York Convention;
(b) Where an arbitral award has been rendered un-
der procedures which operate unfairly against a
party, recognition and enforcement may be refused;
(c) Where a governmental agency is a party to a
commercial transaction and it has entered in re-
spect of that transaction into an arbitration
agreement, it should not be able to invoke sover-
eign immunity in respect of an arbitration com-
menced pursuant to that agreement
.
For discussion of the proposal see generally e.g. Holtzman,
supra note 6, at 9 - 15; 9 Klaus Peter Berger, International
Economic Arbitration 37 - 41 (Norbert Horn et al eds . , 1993) .
Comments by the Secretariat on the decision by the
Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee on international
commercial arbitration taken at its seventeenth session, UN-
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proceedings and mandatory norms of the national arbitration
laws of the place of arbitration. This conflict may be
used in the future as a ground for refusal under article
V(l) (d) of the New York Convention. In this setting the
international arbitrator will have to either set aside par-
ties agreement in order to ensure its enforceability, or
comply with party autonomy and with the possible negative
consequences
.
CITRAL, para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 9/127/Add. 1 , (1977)
[hereinafter Comments by the Secretariat]
.
Berger, supra note 108, at 38.
New York Convention, supra note 19, art. V(l) (d) is pro
cedural irregularities
Berger, supra note 108, at 39 arguing that the arbitrator
has "to ensure that the award will not be set aside at the
seat, which might result in the refusal of recognition of
the award abroad under the New York Convention."
A number of commentators have expressed a view that an
international commercial arbitrator has to render an award
which is enforceable under the New York Convention. E.g.
Bernard G. Poznancki, The Nature and Extent of an Arbitra-
tors ' s Powers in International Commercial Arbitration, 4 J.
Int'l Arb. 3 71, 86 (1987); Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Public
Policy and Arbitrabilily, in ICCA Congress Series N3 : Comparative
Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration 177, 18 5 (Pieter
Sanders ed., 1983) saying that "... the arbitrator has at
least a moral obligation to give the parties an award which
can be expected to stand both in case of setting aside pro-
cedures and in case of enforcement procedures, before the
national court.'; Andreas Bucher, Court Intervention in Ar-
bitration, in International Arbitration in the 21st Century: Towards
"Judicialization" and Uniformity? 29, 38 ("The arbitral tribunal
should in any case undertake whatever is necessary to make
sure that the award is enforceable, in particular by decid-
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In its comments to the AALCC proposal the International
Chamber of Commerce also suggested that UNCITRAL should also
consider the effect of article V(l) (b) of the Convention 11
"which gives extraterritorial effects to the setting-aside
of award for violation of particular rules by granting a
ground for refusal of recognition and enforcement" in the
national courts.
2. Comments by the UNCITRAL Secretariat
In its comments to the AALCC proposal, the UNCITRAL
Secretariat divided the suggestion into two issues: (a) en-
suring party autonomy to agree on arbitration whilst safe-
guarding fairness in arbitral proceedings, and (b) the ex-
clusion in international arbitration of reliance on
sovereign immunity.
ing in such a way that the award cannot be successfully
challenged when a request for enforcement is brought before
a court . " )
.
New York Convention, supra note 19, art. V(l) (b) is the
due process defense.
115 United Nations Commission on International Trade Report,
UN Doc. A/33/17 (1978)
.
116 Comments by the Secretariat, supra note 109, para. 3, but
see Redfern & Hunter, supra note 5, at 508 dividing into
three issues, such as "... judicial review of fairness and
due process and the implied waiver of state immunity."
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Commenting on the first issue the Secretariat stressed
that the Convention was not primarily created to deal with
arbitral proceedings as such. The Secretariat concluded
that only if the scope of the New York Convention would be
substantially modified will it cover the issue raised by the
AALCC. Furthermore, the Secretariat concluded that the
New York Convention is in favor of party autonomy. As an
example, it mentioned article V(l) (d) of the Convention un-
der which one of the reasons of the denial of the enforce-
ment of the rendered award is when the "... arbitral proce-
dure was not in accordance with the agreement of the
parties, ... ." Moreover, this provision does not permit
any attack on the enforcement or recognition of the award
even if the arbitral procedure were not in accordance with
the national laws of the place of arbitration, but were in
accordance with the agreement of the parties. Summarizing
the above, it was concluded that if the denial of the en-
forcement of an award may not succeed under the first part
of the article then it may be achieved only with the second
part - the public policy defense. Such a conclusion sug-
gests that the proposal may have effect in the given circum-
Id. Comments by the Secretariat para. 5
118 T-J OId. para . 8
.
119
Id.
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stance only if the public policy defense would be replaced
with a rule requiring the "minimum standard of fairness."
On the second issue the Secretariat stressed that the
AALCC's primary intention with such an amendment is to pre-
vent a state agency from invoking sovereign immunity during
arbitration, including the stage of recognition and enforce-
ment of the arbitral awards. Such circumstances are
bringing uncertainty to commercial transactions. ' Thus the
AALCC suggested that it should be specified in the Conven-
tion that the "plea of jurisdictional immunity" should not
be upheld in cases when a governmental agency has entered
into a valid arbitration agreement concerning a commercial
transaction.
Underlining the importance of the issue, the Secretar-
iat specified that this proposal, first of all, is intended
to cover the issue of the jurisdiction of the courts of the
place of arbitration over the arbitral procedure. The Sec-
retariat concluded that this is subject to the procedural
aspects of the international commercial arbitration, which
the New York Convention did not intended to cover, and any
modification will be unwise because of that. Secondly,
Comments by the Secretariat para. 9.
121 t-j .. .,Id. para. 11.
122 TJ i nId. para. 10.
* 2 3
-rj -, ~Id. para. 12.
34
the proposal is intended to cover the question whether such
immunity may be raised at the place where recognition and
enforcement is sought. This issue is within the scope of
the Convention; this is why it is appropriate to include it
125in a protocol to the New York Convention.
Nevertheless, the Secretariat concluded that even
though the questions raised by the AALCC are of importance,
preparation of a protocol to the New York Convention "may
not be the most adequate way of dealing with these is-
12 6
sues." The Secretariat further suggested considering the
possibility of preparation of a new convention or a uniform
law on international commercial arbitration.
3 . Study of the New York Convention
Prompted by the AALCC proposal and the comments made
by the Secretariat, the UNCITRAL suggested the Secretary
-
124 _ , _ _
Id. para . 13
.
Comments by the Secretariat, but see Jan van den Berg,
supra note 15, at 456 saying that "this difficulty can be
overcome if legislation or case law in various countries
evolves to extend the currently recognized waiver of immu-
nity from jurisdiction to encompass as well a waiver of im-
munity from execution for arbitral awards. For the time be-
ing, it is recommended to include in a contract with a state
a clause explicitly waiving immunity from execution."
Id. para. 15.
127
Id.
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General conduct a study to review the questions of applica-
tion and interpretation of the New York Convention. The
survey examined more than one hundred judgments of the na-
tional courts applying and interpreting the New York Conven-
tion. It concluded that most of the provisions of the
Convention did not give rise to any noteworthy problems, al-
though certain difficulties were observed in applying and
interpreting articles II and V, and, to a lesser degree, ar-
.
. , x 129tide I
.
In particular, the study mentioned that the Convention
failed to address the uncertainty as to which country's law
should be applicable in respect of the validity of the arbi-
tration agreements. The other visible problem is that in
a number of cases it was revealed that the disparity of the
national laws led to different results in similar enforce-
ment actions. The study concluded that the weight of
these problems was not enough to justify the preparation of
a protocol to the Convention. Furthermore, it was pointed
Study on the Application and Interpretation of the Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards (New York, 1958) . Report by the Secretary-
General. U.N. A/CN. 9/168 (1979) [hereinafter Study on the
New York Convention]
.
129
Id. para. 48.
130
-r-J /inId. para. 49.
131
Id.
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out that the New York Convention has "satisfactorily met the
general purpose for which it was adopted."
4. UNCITRAL's Dicision
After considering the AALCC's proposal, the comments of
the Secretariat and the study conducted by the Secretary-
General, the UNCITRAL rejected the proposal for modification
of the New York Convention, stating that the Convention has
proven to work successfully over the years. Instead of
revising the Convention the Commission suggested to prepare
a model law on international commercial arbitration, which
would be the most desired path in order to achieve uniform-
ity of arbitral procedure. Such a model law on interna-
tional commercial arbitration, if implemented by different
countries, modifies domestic law on arbitration to meet
standards of international commercial arbitration, unifies
national laws on international arbitration, and diminishes
diversity between frequently used arbitration rules and na-
tional laws. ' Furthermore, it also incorporates the Stan-
ly t •, __Id. para. 50
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) Report of Its Twelfth Session, June 18-29, 1979,
Excerpt from the United Nations General Assembly Official
Record, 34 th Session, Supplement No. 17, para 77. A/34/17.
134
Id.
135
Id. para. 78.
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dard of fairness, promoted by the AALCC, and will be rele-
vant in the context of the ICC proposal. Moreover, any
amendment or modification of the New York Convention would
also cause confusion and diminish accession to or ratifica-
tion of the Convention. Finally, a model law was seen as a
more realistic way to lead to harmonization in practice,
rather than the less flexible approach of a convention.
B. Proposals to Eliminate Interventions by
National Courts.
Many important questions other than recognition and en-
forcement of arbitration agreements and of foreign arbitral
13 8
awards are outside the scope of the Convention. The real-
ity of such an internationally non regulated field creates a
situation where the loopholes of the New York Convention are
regulated by the national laws. One such loophole is the
question of interrelationship between the arbitrator or the
arbitral tribunal with the national courts. What should be
the degree of court intervention into arbitral proceedings?
Who should have the power to rule on the subject of the pro-
visional measures? Should this and other questions of pro-
136
Id.
Redfern & Hunter, supra note 5, at 509 stating that the
"approach adopted was pragmatic."
Supra note 41.
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cedural nature be included into the revised New York Conven-
tion? Any such clarifications ultimately will widen the
scope of the New York Convention by introducing new provi-
sions dealing with the procedural aspects of international
commercial arbitration.
1. Pre-award Attachment
The importance of the provisional measures, such as
pre-award attachment, as security for enforcement of the
eventual award, is indisputable. ' If such measures were
not available it would have been impossible to seek the en-
forcement of the award in many circumstances due to acts
which may remove the assets of the losing party from the
reach of the winning party once the award has been ren-
dered. ' The respondent can prolong the proceedings, thus
using the time to place the assets in question beyond the
reach of the potential creditor.
E.g. Berg, supra note 1, at 139; Sigvard Jarvin, Ts Ex-
clusion of Concurrent Courts Jurisdiction Over Conservatory-
Measures to be Introduced by a Revision of the Convention?
,
6 J. Int'l Arb. 1 171 (1989); Bernardo M. Cremades, Is Ex-
clusion of Concurrent Courts Jurisdiction Over Conservatory
Measures to be Introduced by a Revision of the Convention?
6. J Int'l Arb. 3 105 (1989); Berg, supra note 15, at 451.
E.g. id. Jarvin; Berg, supra note 15, at 4 51.
Cremades, supra note 13 9, at 105.
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The current international enforcement system does not
contain any express provisions on the subject of the pre-
award attachment. In any case the applicability of the pre-
award attachment will ultimately depend on the national laws
of the court where the attachment is sought. ' Thus, a
question arises as to who should have the power to rule on
the matter of the pre-award attachment? One of the commen-
tators has expressed the view that "no court has doubted
that an attachment in connection with the enforcement of an
award is compatible with the New York Convention." ' The
justification is to secure future possible payment under the
award. Almost all national courts of the contracting
states, which have addressed the issue have permitted that
pre-award attachment. The only exception is the United
States, where there is a diversity of opinion on this mat-
ter. It has been suggested that the Supreme Court of the
E.g. Berg, supra note 15, at 4 51; Jarvin, supra note 13 9,
at 174.
Berg, supra note 15, at 451.
Jarvin, supra note 13 9, at 174, also brings the example
of Australia, Germany, France, Israel, the Netherlands and
Sweden.
E.g. Berg, supra note 1, at 139-144; Cremades, supra note
13 9, at 107. In McFreavy Tire Rubber Co. Ceat Spa 501 F.2d
1032 (3d Cir. 1974) the appellate court did not permit pre-
award attachment. Contrary result was in Carolina Power
Lights Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp . 1044 (N.D. Cal 1977)
where the district court permitted pre-award attachment.
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United State should rule on this issue in order to stop this
diversity on pre-award attachments.
It has been suggested that court jurisdiction over pro-
visional measures should be excluded by an amendment to the
New York Convention. Court jurisdiction over pre-award at-
tachment is implied under the current enforcement system and
such a revision would explicitly exclude national courts
from it. Modification would explicitly give such jurisdic-
tion to the arbitrator or the arbitration tribunal. It has
been argued that if the parties have resorted to arbitra-
tion, explicitly avoiding the jurisdiction of the courts,
the arbitrator, or the tribunal should have jurisdiction
over the pre-award attachment. ' Secondly, such jurisdic-
tion is more efficient than resorting to the national
courts, because any delay on this important matter may have
a serious negative effect on the future performance of the
rendered arbitral award. Finally, the respondent may resort
to court in order to delay the proceedings, increase the
price of arbitration, or make it more difficult for the win-
ning party to receive the performance.
Even though such a revision may, at first glance, make
the international commercial arbitration work more effi-
ciently, ultimately the negative effects would be higher be-
Berg, supra note 15, at 456.
Jarvin, supra note 13 9, at 171
148
Id. at 178
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cause of the very nature of international commercial arbi-
tration. The need for the pre-award attachment arises at
the very first stage of the dispute. At this point the ar-
bitrator may not yet be appointed or other formalities may
be necessary in order for them to fulfill there duties.
Another very persuasive argument against such jurisdiction
is the cases where the assets under dispute are in the pos-
session of third parties. In such circumstances the arbi-
trator would be powerless due to the private nature of in-
ternational commercial arbitration. He or she would not
have the authority to decide on matters that are beyond the
scope of the arbitration agreement. The decisions of the
arbitrator are binding only on the sides, who are party to
the arbitration agreement. Furthermore, court practice
has shown that the present system does not delay arbitration
and is efficient enough to satisfy the needs of modern com-
mercial arbitration. ' Taking into the account all this ar-
guments it is indisputable that court assistance on this
matter is necessary.
Jarvin, supra note 13 9, at 178.
150
Id. at 179
151
Id.
152
Id,
E.g. Jarvin, supra note 139, at 178; Cremades, supra note
139, at 110.
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2 . Arbitration Proceedings
No less important than pre-award attachment is the
question of court intervention during the arbitration pro-
ceedings. The Convention, because of its limited scope,
does not basically regulate matters of arbitration proceed-
ings. This explains why the courts using provisions of the
national law actively intervene during arbitration proceed-
ings and create further problems.
It has been suggested that, through an amendment to the
New York Convention, it is necessary to prevent national
courts at the place of arbitration from intervening during
the arbitration proceedings. This should include all as-
pects of the arbitral process such as appointment of arbi-
trators, arbitration agreement, attacks on partial and/or
final awards. This is especially true when the courts us-
ing national law, try to reduce party autonomy, the compe-
tence of the arbitrators to decide on its own jurisdiction,
the arbitrators freedom to conduct the proceedings according
to the parties' will, or the arbitral tribunal's deci-
sions. Nevertheless, even though this proposal suggests
Rubino-Samartano, An International Arbitral Court of Ap-
peals as Alternative to Long Attacks and Recognition Pro-
ceedings, 6 J. Int'l Arb. 1 181, 186 (1989).
155
Id.
Werner, supra note 24, at 116.
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exclusion of the intervention of courts from arbitration
proceedings, it welcomes the national courts to assist in
the conduct of arbitration. This should not be prevented
where one party does not want to comply with the valid arbi-
tration agreement or disregards the arbitral tribunal. This
is also true for cases when necessary to procure evidence,
15 8if it cannot be obtained voluntarily. This proposal aims
at making the modern international commercial arbitration
more efficient by improving the autonomy of arbitration and
by permitting national courts to intervene in a limited num-
ber of cases. In other instances, discussed above, the na-
tional courts will not have the power to interfere with ar-
bitration procedures.
The current solution of this very important issue is
proposed, not through the amendment of the New York Conven-
tion, but through the adoption by the countries of the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, as
their national legislation. ' A number of provisions of the
157
E.g. Rubino-Samartano, supra note at 116; id. Werner at
116-117, 119.
158
Id.
15 9 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion, reprinted in Report of the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law on the Works of its Eighteenth
Session, Annex 1, at 81-93, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (1985)
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law or Model Law]
.
Werner, supra note 24, at 119.
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Model Law are designed for courts to aid arbitral proceed-
ings. Court intervention is permitted only in limited cases,
as specified in the model. Even though this solution has
been criticized, it seems that universal adoption of the
Model Law will solve most of the existing problems, rather
than modification of the Convention, which may create only
uncertainty and additional difficulties to be discussed fur-
ther in this paper.
Another proposal to eliminate difficulties during arbi-
tration proceedings is to improve the standard arbitration
clause. It has been suggested that this should be achieved
through an annex to the New York Convention, which will make
the new standard arbitration clause mandatory for the member
states. It was criticized that standard arbitration
clauses, which currently exist, do not cover a number of im-
portant issues and are a reason for "very heated disputes
and difficulties during arbitration proceedings which con-
tribute to their length." Thus, annexing a new arbitra-
161 Infra notes 248 - 257
162 Werner, supra note 24, at 119 where the author underlines
that he "... would have much preferred the question of the
parties' autonomy in the conduct of the proceedings and the
assistance of the court to be dealt with by a revision of
the New York Convention rather than in the Model Law." See
also chapter IV (E)
.
Rubino-Samartano, supra note 154, at 187.
164
Id.
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tion clause to the New York Convention will simplify the ar-
bitral proceedings. Current standard arbitration clauses
are criticized because they do not contain mandatory provi-
sions concerning the choice of law, the set of procedural
rules, the choice of place of arbitration, the language of
the arbitral proceedings and, finally, the nationality of
the arbitrators. Clarification should be introduced with
regard to these issues. ' Such clarification should elimi-
nate much misunderstanding that may arise after the dispute
is submitted to arbitration. As a matter of fact, it is
necessary to mention that this proposal is not viewed to be
achieved separately, but as a complex of measures proposed
in the context with other possible amendments to the New
York Convention.
C. Proposals to Narrow the Defenses under The New
York Convention
Id. at 187-188, but see generally Narayanaswami Krishna
-
murti, Some Thoughts on a New Convention on International
Arbitration, in The Art of Arbitration 2 07 (Jan C. Schutsz and
Albert Jan van den Berg eds . 1982) , who argues that the ne-
cessity of establishment the place of arbitration, and ap-
plicable law should not be introduced in the agreement of
the parties, but rather the arbitrators should have freedom
to decide on it afterwards.
E.g. generally, Rubino-Samartano, supra note 154; Werner,
supra note 24
.
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The core of the New York Convention is article V. The
article contains the limited number of grounds which may be
used as defences to recognition and enforcement by the re-
spondent , and by the court at its own discretion. Even
though the grounds are limited, in many instances they are
not considered narrow enough, creating difficulties in the
recognition and enforcement procedures and possible attacks
on the award rendered. This is one of the main arguments
made for narrowing the defenses available under the New York
Convention. Over the years there have been a number of pro-
posals aimed to modify this article as a whole or to modify
its specific provisions.
1. Provisions of the 1980 French Decree as a
Model for Possible Modifications
One of the proposals made by a leading expert in arbi-
tration that the grounds for rejection of recognition and
enforcement of the New York Convention should be
"simplified, reduced in ambit and rendered more precise."
The author suggests that compared to the defenses listed in
16 7 New York Convention, supra note 19, art. V(l)
.
168
Id. art V(2) .
Clive M. Schmitthoff, Finality of Arbitral Awards and Ju-
dicial Review, in Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration
230, 237 (Julian D.M. Lew ed., 1987).
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the French Decree on International Trade Arbitration of 1980
("French Decree"), the grounds of recognition and enforce-
ment are "antiquated" . The gist of the proposal is to
narrow the possible grounds that may be introduced, by the
party challenging the award or by the national court on its
own discretion, in order to reduce the attacks by simplify-
ing the recognition and enforcement challenges. The pro-
posal suggested to use the grounds introduced in the French
T^ 171Decree
.
The French Decree ' follows the general principles of
the grounds for refusal of enforcement introduced in the New
York Convention. Nevertheless, the Decree substantially re-
duced the number of grounds for the refusal and, moreover,
drastically simplified them. Three grounds of the New York
Td. This Decree has been introduced into the French Code
of Civil Procedure by the Decree of May 12, 1981. Civil
Code, art. 2,059 - 2,061 and Decret 81-500 of May 1981 in
Journal officiol 14 May 1981 sur 1' Arbitrage.
Schmitthoff, supra note 16 9.
172
Id. at 233:
It provides that a decision refusing the recogni-
tion or enforcement of a foreign award is subject
to appeal only in the following instances:
1. absence, nullity or expiry of the arbitration
agreement
;
2. irregular appointment of the arbitrators;
3. the arbitrator's failure to respect the terms
of reference;
4. violation of the principle of fairness;
5
.
when it is contrary to international public
policy as to recognition or enforcement.
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Convention concerning due process, the non-binding award,
and non-arbitrability are excluded. It seems that the due
process and the non-binding award defenses were excluded be-
cause a new defense was introduced - the violation of the
principle of fairness, which in a sense summarizes the two
above. As for the arbitrability ground, the French Decree
concerns only matters of international trade; therefore,
there is no need for this defense. Furthermore, the public
policy defense has been narrowed into international public
-,
. 174policy.
Overall such modifications should reduce difficulties
with the enforcement of the awards in the national courts.
The possibility of the attacks will be narrowed and the de-
fenses will become more limited and less complicated.
2. Modifications of Specific Defenses
Over the years, the question of modifying the specific
provisions of article V have also been raised. One of the
provisions of the New York Convention, permitting refusal of
the enforcement of the award if the rendered award have been
set aside in the country of origin, has been particularly
New York Convention, supra note 19, art. V(l) (b) and (e)
,
art. V(2) (a) . Discussion on these grounds see chapter 3 of
this paper.
This question would be discussed further in this chapter.
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discussed by Berg. It was questioned whether or not this
ground needs to be changed or eliminated. The worry was
expressed that by not specifying this provision there had
been created a situation when the rendered award might be
set aside in the country of origin on "all grounds contained
in the arbitration law of the country of origin." Such an
interpretation would reject the limited character of the
grounds of refusal of article V and basically interfere with
the uniformity to which the New York Convention is aimed.
The survey of cases under the Convention shows that
this provision has not produced the negative effect which it
17 8theoretically may have. This is explained less by the
fact that once the award is set aside in the country of ori-
gin it is unlikely that the enforcement would be pursued in
another country, but rather that this is "initiated in ex-
ceptional cases only." " The author argues that in any
event elimination of this provision is not desirable. The
losing party should have to have the "validity of the award
18finally adjudicated in one jurisdiction." Otherwise, it
New York Convention, supra note 19, art. V(l) (e
Berg, supra note 1, at 3 55.
177
Id.
Berg, supra note 1, at 355.
179
Id.
180
Id.
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may create a situation when the losing party may be pursued
in different jurisdictions, with a questionable award, until
it will be enforced. But in the current situation, where
this provision is preserved in the New York Convention, the
claimant will not have this opportunity because practically
the award would not be enforced due to the set aside provi-
181
sion.
This question has been solved in the UNCITRAL Model Law
on international commercial arbitration, where a solution
has been found in order to preserve this provision and at
the same time not to extend the grounds for refusal by in-
cluding specifically provisions of the national law of the
country of origin. Under the UNCITRAL Model law the provis-
sions for seting aside an award in the country of origin are
almost identical to the provissions under which enforcement
183
can be rejected in the enforcement country. " This approach
permits preserving the setting aside provision and also not
to widening the limited defenses under the New York Conven-
tion.
A number of proposals have been made to change the sec-
ond part of article V of the New York Convention. This ar-
ticle gives the national courts of enforcing countries the
power to deny enforcement on their own discretion if the
181
Id.
182 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 159.
183 New York Convention, supra note 19, art. 46
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subject matter is not arbitrable under its national laws or
it would be contrary to the public policy of the enforcing
184
country.
Under the first part of article V (2) of the New York
Convention an arbitrator is under a dilemma while rendering
an award. The difficulty may appear at the stage of recog-
nition and enforcement, when the national court would rule
that this subject matter is not arbitrable under the laws of
the enforcing country. The contracting states have shown a
wide diversity in regard to the non-arbitrable subject mat-
185ters. " Examples of such non-arbitrable subject matters are
anti-trust, the validity of intellectual property (patents,
trademarks) , family law, protection of certain weaker par-
18 6
ties, etc. Several courts have already ruled on the sub-
ject matter of arbitration under the New York Convention. In
18 7Scherk the United State Supreme Court was faced with the
question of arbitrability of securities transactions. The
Supreme Court concluded that even though such disputes may
not be arbitrable if the contract is domestic, they are ar-
bitrable if the contract is international. The Italian Su-
184
Id. art.V (2) .
1 or
E.g. Berg, supra note 1, at 3 75; Gaja, supra note 71, s
I.C. 4.
186
Jd. at 369-370.
187 Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), reh'g
denied 419 U.S. 885 (1974)
.
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preme Court in Scherk Enterprises A.G. v. Society des
18 8Grandes Marques determined the question of the arbitrabil-
ity of the trademarks. The Court held that the arbitration
is valid because the action is based on the question of the
contractual rights in regard to the trade marks. The Court
also declared a necessity of judicial proceedings in regard
18 9
of some other questions. In LIAMCO the United State Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia refused to enforce
an award stating that nationalization is a subject matter
not capable of settlement by arbitration.
Taking into consideration that the non-arbitrable sub-
ject matters widely differ from country to country and such
a situation creates difficulties in the flow of interna-
tional commercial arbitration, there was made a proposal to
amend this part of article V (2) . It was proposed to pre-
pare an annex to the New York Convention or new convention
which will establish a generally acceptable list of non-
arbitrable subject matters for all contracting states. As
a first practical step it was suggested that it is necessary
to complete a list of non-arbitrable subject matters for
188 Cass., sez. un., 12 may 1977, n. 3989, Giur. It. 1977.
Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahirya, 482 F . Supp . 1175 (D.C.D.C. 1980) .
190 Ion Nestor, Report of 1972 to UNCITRAL: Problems Concern-
ing Application and Interpretation of Existing Multilateral
Conventions on International Commercial Arbitration and Re-
lated Matters, 193, 244, para. 172, UNCITRAL Y.B
.
, Vol III,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/64 (1972).
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each member State, which may be regularly published. Fur-
thermore, it was proposed to exclude all international trade
disputes from being non-arbitrable "subject to rules of in-
ternational public policy of each country."
This proposal was highly criticized by commentators for
a number of reasons. First, it will be very difficult to
create such a list, which will include all possible hypo-
thetical situations that may arise in the future and be ac-
ceptable for all contracting states. Second, in many in-
stances it is not clear which subject matter is not
arbitrable in many systems of national law. Third, States
may try to use this opportunity not to include non-
arbitrable matters, but to include exclusively arbitrable
19 6
matters, and expressly follow them. The latter, instead
of improving the situation, will make it even more compli-
cated.
Under the New York Convention enforcement may be denied
by the national courts on their own discretion if the award
191
Id.
192
Id.
193 E.g. Berg, supra note 1, at 3 75; Bockstiegel, supra note
113, at 190.
Id. Bockstiegel.
Berg, supra note 1, at 3 75.
196
Id.
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is "contrary to the public policy of that country." Na
tional public policy has been a traditional ground used for
refusal of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, foreign
judgments or the use of the foreign law. Almost all inter-
national conventions on these matters include such a provi-
sion. Nevertheless, it is increasingly important to dif-
ferenciate between domestic and international public policy
in the international context. The main idea of such a
distinction is that the number of matters falling under pub-
lic policy in international cases is smaller than in domes-
tic cases. Such an interpretation will make this provision
of the New York Convention much narrower and limit the at-
tack on the awards rendered. That is why a proposal to
amend the public policy provision of the New York Convention
was made so that the national courts of the enforcing coun-
try could only apply international public policy defenses to
deny recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral
197 New York Convention, supra note 19, art. V(2) (b)
.
19 8 Berg, supra note 1, at 360.
For an excellent comparison of international and domestic
public policy in international commercial arbitration see
generally e.g. Stephen M. Schwebel and Susan G. Lahne , Pub-
lic Policy and Arbitral Procedure, in I CCA Congress Series N3 :
Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration 2 05
(Pieter Sanders ed. , 1987); Piere Lalive, Transnational (or
Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbi-
tration, in ICCA Congress Series N3 : Comparative Arbitration Practice
and Public Policy in Arbitration 259 (Pieter Sanders ed. , 1987) .
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awards. ' Basically this proposal's purpose is to establish
what has already been done by the national courts of the
contracting states by distinguishing between the interna-
tional and domestic public policy and narrowing interpreta-
tion of the provision of the Convention.
Taking into account this narrow interpretation of the
New York Convention by the national courts in the various
contracting states and the limited number of cases in which
the public policy defense has succeeded, even though it has
been frequently invoked, it seems that the problem has
been exaggerated.
Howard M. Holtzmann, A Task for the 21st Century: Creat-
ing a New International Court for Resolving Disputes on the
Enforceability of Arbitral Awards, in The Internationalization of
International Arbitration 109, 113 (Martin Hunter et al eds .
,
1995)
.
E.g. in Scherk, supra note 187 the Supreme Court of the
United State has already differed between international and
domestic public policy in international commercial arbitra-
tion; in Rakta, supra note 80, at 974, the United State
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reasoned that the
enforcement under the provision of the public policy of the
New York Convention should be denied only if it would
"violate the forum state's most basic notions of morality
and justice"; Berg, supra note 1 at 365-366 underlining that
the German and Swiss courts have also constructed this pro-
vision of the New York Convention narrowly and apply it only
in "extreme cases"
.
E.g. Berg, supra note 1, at 366; Gaja, supra note 71, s
I.C. 5.
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D. Exclusion of National Courts from Enforcement
Proceedings
The last resort for the winning party to receive the
performance of the rendered award is the power of the na-
tional courts, where the assets of the loser are located, to
enforce it. National courts of the enforcement country are
the key players of the enforcement scheme under the New York
Convention. This has been viewed as one of the main disad-
vantages of the current enforcement system of the foreign
arbitral awards.
A number of weaknesses of the recourse to the national
courts have been pointed out. One of the main weaknesses
viewed is that the current system, created by the Conven-
tion, results in lengthy enforcement proceedings open to at-
tacks by the national courts. The next weakness is that
due to the fact that assets of the losing party are usually
in the country of origin, the winning party will have to en-
force the award to some extent in a hostile environment.
This weakness does away with the primary advantage of inter-
See generally e.g. Rubino-Samartano, supra note 154;
Holtzmann, supra note 200, at 109; Stephen M. Schwebel, The
Creation and Operation of an International Court of Arbitral
Awards, in The Internationalization of International Arbitration 115
(Martin Hunter et al eds
.
, 1995).
Id. Rubino Samartano.
Holtzman, supra note 200, at 112.
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national commercial arbitration over litigation: shorter
proceedings and no resort to the national courts with whom
the parties are not familiar.
Generally speaking, all the proposals for the modifica-
tion of the New York Convention are aimed towards the im-
provement of the current enforcement system of the foreign
arbitral awards. The following proposals in contrast to all
previous proposals, if implimented, will totally exclud the
national courts from the enforcement scheme. The aim of
these proposals is to create a supranational court of inter-
national commercial arbitration, entitled for the enforce-
ment of the rendered arbitral awards. This is foreseen to
be achieved either through an amendment to the existing New
"J C\ C. *y r\ *7
York Convention or by establishment of a new convention.
Exclusion of national courts is viewed, by the authors of
the proposals, as the best solution in order to minimize the
weaknesses of the New York Convention. If implemented, this
would totally change the system of recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign arbitral awards.
1. Introduction of Appellate Proceedings
2 06 Rubino-Samartano, supra note 154, at 184.
Holtzman, supra note 200, at 112.
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2 8The first proposal envisages introduction of appeal
procedures into international commercial arbitration. The
new court - the International Arbitral Court of Appeals
("IACA") - will be responsible for appointment and supervi-
sion of the appellate proceedings, conducted by the appeal
panel. It is argued that if the most national legal sys-
tems permit two instances in litigation then it should be
210permissible in arbitration as well. The appellate panel
will have the power to review the arbitral award on the mer-
its, which is "essential to protect the parties' rights and,
in the end, also protect the arbitral institution itself." 211
2 08 For simplicity the proposal by Rubino-Samartano will be
referred as the "first proposal" and the proposal by Holtz-
man as the "second proposal", due to the difference of the
dates made on.
Rubino-Samartano, supra note 154, at 185. The author
proposes that this panel should be composed of three arbi-
trators, two of whom will be appointed by the parties and
the chairman by the IACA.
Rubino-Samartano, supra note 154, at 182. The author dis-
cusses two contra arguments: that the arbitrators have
higher standards and substantial time increase needed an ad-
ditional instance. As a justification for the new system he
argues that an average arbitrator does not have higher stan-
dards than an average judge and , as for longer time needed,
he proposes that the first instance should be undertaken un-
der a new framework: one year arbitration with one arbitra-
tor .
Id. at 183. It has become common to propose the necessity
of the review on the merits of the arbitral awards . For an-
other such proposal see Schmittoff, supra note at 237, where
the author suggests necessity of the review on the merits of
59
The losing party will resort to the new court in order to
appeal the previously rendered award. In cases when the
losing party will neither appeal nor perform the award, the
winning party will be able to apply to the IACA in order to
confirm the rendered award.
The new court is viewed as a body which will be able to
establish the "necessary quality of supervision" in order
to satisfy the expectations of the contracting states. This
"satisfaction" will in return treat the appeal award as fi-
nal and not attackable in the contracting states. This de-
cision will afterwards be automatically enforced in the mem-
ber countries. Basically the award will have total immunity
against any attack from national courts. The authority of
the International Arbitration Court of Appeals should be the
sufficient enough to justify that the national courts will
not attack the award and set aside recognition proceedings.
The award will become an "enforceable instrument in all con-
tracting states."
the award by the courts, in contrast to Rubino-Samartano, if
the parties voluntarily agree.
212
Id. at 185.
213
Id.
Rubino-Samartano, supra note 154, at 185.
215
Jd. at 187.
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2. Creation of a Supranational Court for the
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
The second proposal, as the first one, promotes a crea-
tion of an International Court of Arbitral Awards
("ICAA") . The new court will have exclusive jurisdiction
over matters of recognition and enforcement of the rendered
awards under article V of the New York Convention. The new
court will promote uniformity and predictability, decrease
the time necessary for the recognition and enforcement of
the arbitral awards and it will reduce "risks and uncertain-
ties that business people fear when they must submit their
affairs to the court of a foreign country."
The contracting states will take on the obligations to
execute judgments of the new international court concerning
218persons and property on its territory. The national
courts of the parties to the convention will be obligated to
give full faith and credit to the judgments of the new
court. The new international court will even have power
to impose sanctions, in a form of damages, on States that do
not fulfill their obligations.
216 Holtzman, supra note 200, at 112
217
Td. at 114.
Holtzman, supra note 200, at 112
Schwebel, supra note 203, at 118
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This new court will not only take over all functions of
the national courts under the New York Convention, but will
also be responsible for setting aside the award or enforcing
it at the place of arbitration. ' Such an approach enables
the parties not to deal with any national court even in the
place of arbitration, if any recourse to the local court
ever arises.
The ICAA will be entitled to look into questions
whether recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may
be refused under the provisions of the New York Convention.
Under this proposal the new court will not review the ren-
dered arbitral award on the merits. ' It should not act, in
any case, as an appellate instance not to create an addi-
tional layer of review. When the loosing party of a Con-
tracting State brings a challenge to the rendered arbitral
award in a national court, the other party will have the
right to remove the challenge to the new court. The ICAA
will have exclusive jurisdiction over the challenge and any
national court of a Contracting State will be obligated to
accept that motion.
Holtzman, supra note 200, at 112.
221
Id.
Schwebel, supra note 203, at 118.
Schwebel, supra note 203, at 119. The proposal provides a
detailed description of the new court. It is proposed that
the number of judges will be from 11 to 15. The ICAA will
respectfully represent main legal systems, trading and arbi-
62
Even if the new international court will be fully re-
sponsible for recognition and enforcement procedures, a re-
course to national authorities will be necessary in order to
execute the rendered arbitral award. The proposal envisages
that in contracting states this function will be fulfilled
by the same authorities that currently are obligated to exe-
cute judgments of the national courts. It is suggested
that if such a provision is not included in the new conven-
tion then the ICAA will become just an additional layer in
22 5the award enforcement scheme. " The party seeking the exe-
cution of the arbitral award will have the binding judgment
of the new court, which has already ruled on the matters of
the validity of the render arbitral award. Basically the
authorities will be actually bound by the force of the in-
tration nations. Bearing in mind that this mainly includes
developed countries other countries should be also repre-
sented. The judges should be elected when the new conven-
tion comes into force. Only members to the convention will
have the power to elect the judges, who will serve one, non-
renewable, term of fifteen years. Also a number of addi-
tional judges should be in reserve to be called if the case
load requires. The judges will be responsible only to the
international community. The new convention should also in-
clude provisions for the adoption of the Rules of the Inter-
national Court of Arbitral Awards by the new court and es-
tablishment of a registry to service the ICAA.
Holtzman, supra note 200, at 113.
225
Id.
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ternational treaty to execute the judgments of the Interna-
2 2 6
tional Court of Arbital Award.
The proposal goes further than just suggesting to ex-
clude national courts from the recognition and enforcement
procedures. It is argued that in order to create greater
efficiency it is necessary to delegate to the new court ad-
ditional powers such as pre-award attachment. The court
should have jurisdiction over the disputed assets, until it
rules on the matter of the recognition and enforcement of
the rendered arbitral award.
Due to the fact that these proposals are of a more re-
cent date, they have nor been criticized nor supported by
the commentators. The general notion is that these propos-
als are far reaching and need further examination. ' Both
authors of the proposals consider them as something for the
future, for the twenty first century. In any case, it seems
that total exclusion of the national courts from enforcement
of the arbitral awards not only seems unrealistic, but
moreover rejection of judicial review may be considered even
unconstitutional in many countries. Furthermore, it seems
Schwebel, supra note 203, at 118.
Holtzman, supra note 200, at 113.
E.g. Werner, supra note 101, at 16 0; Martin Hunter, In-
tervention by Martin Hunter: "The Impopssible Dream", in
Internationalization of International Arbitration 157 (Martin Hunter
et al eds. , 1995)
.
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that it will be practically impossible to create such a
mechanism when the countries would give up their control
over the enforcement through the national courts. Even less
realistic is the proposed system of the execution of the
judgments, where the executive bodies would have the obliga-
tions to do it, without the national courts reviewing the
matter. Today the existing international courts have major
difficulties with the execution of their judgments. It
seems that a new international court would have even more
problems when the parties are private persons.
E. Maintaining the Present Enforcement System.
International commercial arbitral awards have been en-
forced worldwide under the 1958 New York Convention for al-
most forty years. ' As it was observed, the proposals to
modify the provisions of the Convention were not imple-
mented. Niether have the leading international arbitration
authorities, such as UNCITRAL, nor arbitral community, in
its majority, not only does not approve, but even opposes to
any changes in the current enforcement system of foreign ar-
bitral awards.
Some of the arguments against particular modification has
already been previously considered this chapter.
230 New York Convention, supra note 19
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1. Arguments for Preservation of the Current
Enforcement System.
The first and only major proposal to amend the New York
Convention, proposed by AALCC, was rejected by UNCITRAL af-
ter extended review. The UNCITRAL rejected any possible
modification, arguing that application and interpretation of
the Convention by the national courts did not create any
significant problems for such an attempt. Furthermore,
the UNCITRAL considered that the difficulties were not of
such magnitude as to go further with the proposed amendment
.
This decision has been extensively used by those commenta-
tors who are opposed to modifications of the present en-
forcement system.
It is argued that any modification to the New York Con-
vention would create additional problems to the interna-
tional enforcement of arbitration awards. Not only would
the creation of a satisfactory text take much time, but it
would presumably take even more time until the current mem-
bers would become parties to the new convention or to the
annex. ' It took almost forty years for the New York Con-
See chapter IV (A)
E.g. Berg, supra note 1, at 2; Glossner, supra note 20,
at 277, mentions that the "UNCITRAL, ..., refused either to
amend the present text or to create a new convention, osten-
sibly for lack of cause."
233
Id. Berg at 394.
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vention to become almost universally accepted. Two-thirds
of the members of the United Nations are contracting states.
It is the only widely excepted convention on matters regard-
ing international commercial law, thus far created under the
auspices of the United Nations. It is not even clear
whether or not current members would wish to become parties
to the revised convention. A view has been expressed that
this may even give some of them a chance to cancel member-
ship using the notion of non agreement with the proposed
amendment. Thus, the created uncertainty, may have nega-
tive effect not only on the process of the enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards, but on the international commercial
arbitration as a whole.
Furthermore, a more or less similar judicial interpre-
tation of the New York Convention created up to this date
will be lost; it will be difficult to tell, with the exact
certainty, how long it will take for new interpretations to
2 3 5be created by national courts. The value of a multilat-
eral convention, where the key players are the national
courts, is first connected with their application and inter-
pretation. A number of extended studies have shown that the
national courts in the contracting states have been inter-
preting and applying the New York Convention more or less in
234
Id.
235
Jd.
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compliance to the concepts and the principles set forth in
the Convention.
Thus, such an approach of not eliminating the existing
problems through changes of the current enforcement system,
does not improve the present enforcement system and leaves
the difficulties untouched. It may be argued whether the
magnitude of the existing problems is enough for modifica-
tion or not, but there is no doubt that their existence ham-
pers the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. That is
why the solution was found in such a way so that not only
would the current system be preserved, but also the problems
created by the current system be solved.
2. Basic Features of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration
The proposed solution to improve the present inforce-
ment system, for most of the remaining problems, is adoption
of the UNCITRAL Model Law by the contracting states to the
Convention as their national legislation. General princi-
ples of the UNCITRAL Model Law are party autonomy, limited
court intervention, significant authority of an arbitrator
and, finally, harmony with the New York Convention.
23 6
E.g. generally Study of the New York Convention, supra
note 12 8; Berg, supra note 1; Gaja, supra note 71; 21 Y.B.
Comm. Arb
.
, supra note 47.
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Party autonomy may be considered as one of the main
principle of the Model Law. Under the Model Law parties may
agree, among other things, on specific arbitrable subject-
matter; on the number of arbitrators; on a procedure of
appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators, subject to the pro-
visions of the same article; on procedural aspects of the
challenge of an arbitrator; on the procedural rules; ' to
determine the place of arbitration; on the language or
languages of arbitration proceedings; ' on the framework for
presenting claims; on the law governing arbitration; on
settlement of the dispute during the arbitration.
See genearally e.g Michael F. Hoellering, The UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 20 Int'l
Law. 327 (1986) ; Gerold Herrmann, The Role of the Courts Un
der the UNCITRAL Model Law Script, in Contemporary Problems in
International /Arbitration 164 (Julian DM Lew ed. , 1987) .
238 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 159, art. 1(3) (c)
.
239
Id. art. 10 (1) .
240
Id. art. 11(2) .
241 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 159, art. 13(1).
242
Jd. art. 19 (1) .
243
Id. art. 20 (1) .
244
Id. art. 22.
245 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 159, art. 23(1) .
246
Id. art. 28 (1) and (3) .
247
Id. art 30 (1) .
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A second important principle of the Model Law is the
limitation on court intervention in arbitration proceedings.
The provisions of the model have taken the middle road on
this matter: on the one hand, preserving the right of the
national courts to intervene in the arbitration proceedings,
and on the other, permitting such intervention only in lim-
ited cases specifically contained in the Model Law. The
adopting state may also choose a specific court or any other
authority competent to perform assistance and supervision of
24 9the actions as specified in the Model Law. Courts may in-
tervene: to order conservative measures of relief; if the
parties fail to agree to appoint an arbitrator; to decide
on the challenge of an arbitrator, if the parties fail to
agree on it; ' to remove an arbitrator in specified circum-
stances; ' to decide challenges to arbitral jurisdiction;
to assist the arbitrators in taking evidence; to set aside
248 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 159, art 5.
249
Id. art. 6.
Id. art. 9.
251
Id. art. 11(3) (b) .
252 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 159, art. 13(3
253
Id. art. 14 (1) .
254
Id. art. 16(3)
255
Id. art. 27
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the award; and, finally, to either enforce or reject the
enforcement of the award.
Thirdly, the UNCITRAL Model Law gives significant
authority to the arbitrators. This is subject only to con-
trary agreement of the parties to the arbitration agree-
O C Q
ment . The arbitral tribunal: may decide on the challenge
n c q
of an arbitrator; ' is competent to rule on its own juris-
diction; ' ' may order interim measures or appropriate secu-
2 61
rity; has the power to determine the procedure for con-
2 6 2duct and the admissibility of any evidence; may decide on
2 6 3
the matter of applicable law.
Finally, the UNCITRAL Model Law was drafted to promote
the policies and principles of the New York Convention.
It was viewed as a vehicle to promote the goals of the Con-
vention. 2 ' The UNCITRAL decided that a model law would be
256 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 159, art. 34.
Id. art. 3 5 and 36.
Hoellering, supra note 237, at 331.
259 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 159, art. 13(2)
260
Id. art 16 (1) .
261
Id. art. 17.
262
Id. art. 19(2) .
263
Id. art. 28 (2) .
Hoellering, supra note 237, at 329.
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incomplete if the recognition and enforcement provisions
2 6 6
were not be included. This was achieved by UNCITRAL by-
preserving the enforcement scheme of the New York Convention
in the Model Law. The articles on enforcement are almost
identical to article V of the New York Convention. In this
way the UNCITRAL not only preserved the enforcement scheme
of a successful Convention, but also has added provisions
which were not covered by the latter.
2 6 5 Kenneth T. Ungar, The Enforcement of Arbitral Awards un
der UNCITRAL' s Model Law on International Commercial Arbi-
tration, 25 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 717, 730 (1987).
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION
The development of international arbitration into one
of the most popular ways of alternative dispute resolution,
during this century, has raised the question of the effi-
cient enforcement of arbitral awards. The whole arbitration
process would not make sense unless the winning party could
obtain enforcement of the award. In order to oblige an un-
willing losing party to comply with the award, the claimant
ultimately has to resort to the national courts of the place
where, for example assets of the losing party are situated.
Thus, an international legal framework for the enforcement
of arbitral awards must be put in place to avoid the injus-
tice of non-compliance with awards.
At the dawn of this century the enforcement procedures
where regulated by the national laws of the place where en-
forcement was sought. Substantial increase of international
commercial arbitration and difficulties with the enforcement
under different national laws, were the main reasons for the
adoption of the first multilateral conventions. The Geneva
Protocol established the validity and enforceability of ar-
bitration agreements and the Geneva Convention regulated
the enforcement of the protocol awards among the contracting
2 6 7 Supra notes 28 and 29 and accompanying text.
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2 6 8
states. Even though they were considered as substantial
improvement the loopholes of the conventions created sub-
2 6 9
stantial difficulties in practice. This prompted the in-
ternational arbitral community to promote and establish a
new convention on international commercial arbitration: the
1958 New York Convention, regulating recognition and en-
forcement of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards.
Even though the Convention applies only to two essential as-
pects of the international commercial arbitration, it has
been referred to as the cornerstone of the modern frameworks
of arbitration. The scope of the Convention is narrowed
by two permitted reservations: the reciprocity reservation
and the commercial reservation. The Convention's enforce-
ment scheme has been substantially modified: member states
are responsible for enforcement of any foreign arbitral
award with limited grounds for refusal of recognition and
enforcement; the burden of proof is with the party opposing
the enforcement.
The Convention currently has 112 parties. More than
650 national court judgments have been reported on the ap-
Supra notes 3 and 31 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 32 - 35 and accompanying text.
Supra note 19.
Supra note 20.
272 See chapter III (A) (2) .
74
plication of the Convention. A number of studies analyzing
the application and interpretation of the New York Conven-
tion by the national courts have concluded that in general
the Convention have been applied in accordance with the
ideas and principles of the latter.
Nevertheless, a number of problems with the enforcement
exist in the current scheme. First, resort to national
courts increases the length and the costs of the enforcement
procedures. Second, the New York Convention regulates only
two aspects of international commercial arbitration, whereas
the others are regulated by the national law. This creates
practical problems and difficulties, especially during the
arbitration process.
Over the years, these and other gaps of the New York
Convention regime has prompted various agencies, scholars,
and practitioners to propose modifications of the provisions
of the Convention. In general, the proposed changes are
aimed at widening the scope, clarifing and/or narrowing the
provisions of the Convention, and creating a more efficient
enforcement scheme. But to date none of them have suc-
ceeded. The text of the Convention has not been changed
since June 10, 1958, when it was first opened for signature.
There is no doubt that the New York Convention has
shown success over the years. It has achieved stability in
the field of international commercial arbitration, and cre-
Supra note 102
75
ated "comity amongst trading nations."" In the majority of
cases, arbitral awards have been enforced by the national
courts according to the principles of the New York Conven-
tion.
This author agrees with the conclusion of the UNCITRAL
and other authoritative commentators that the magnitude of
the problems is not enough to undertake modifications whose
resultes surely to create uncertainty and additional prob-
lems. Over the years a more or less uniform interpreta-
tion of the New York Convention has been created by the na-
2 76tional courts. It might take another forty years until
the current contracting states would become parties to the
new convention. All this, that have been achieved in the
realm of interpretation of the Convention, would be at risk
if it were to be modified.
However, leaving gaps in the Convention untouched, at
the same time, does not solve the existing problems. One
commentator suggested that "nothing in this world is fail-
proof and eternal" : it is necessary to find a solution for
the existing problems.
Glosner, supra note 20, at 279.
See chapter IV (A); Berg, supra note 1; Glosner, supra
note 20.
2 76 Supra note 233.
Glosner, supra note 20, at 279.
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It seems, that for the time being, the best solution is
to adopt by the contracting state the proposed UNCITRAL
Model Law on international commercial arbitration. This
will preserve the existing "dual system" in international
commercial arbitration, where some aspects are regulated by
international conventions and the rest by the applicable na-
2 7 8tional law. Adoption of the Model Law harmonizes national
laws on international commercial arbitration and frees in-
ternational commercial arbitration "from the parochial law
279
of any given state."
The current successful enforcement system is preserved
and many problematic aspects are regulated under harmonized
national laws. In fact, this is why the Model Law has
adopted the same enforcement scheme of the New York Conven-
tion. Wide party autonomy, limited court intervention, sig-
nificant authority of the arbitrator, are the general prin-
ciples of the Model Law. These are the gaps of the New York
Convention. By adopting the Model Law the contracting states
eliminate most of the problems and preserve the enforcement
scheme of the Convention.
More than twenty countries and several states of the
United States have already adopted the Model law as their
V.S. Despande, International Commercial Arbitration: Uni-
formity of Jurisdiction, 5 J. Int'l Arb . 2 115, 125 (1988).
279 Hoellering, supra note 237, at 327
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internal legislation. With the increase of this number the
success of the Model Law approache would be evident
.
Adoption of the Model Law is the best alternative to
uncertainty and artificial problems that would be created
with the modification of the New York Convention. This
author fully agrees with the statement that "the era of the
international conventions on international arbitration, or
2 81its amendments, is past." Now is the time for harmonized
national laws and court decisions on international commer-
cial arbitration through the enactment by states of the UN-
CITRAL Model Law and the New York Convention. Together they
form a highly satisfactory regime for international commer-
cial arbitration.
2 8
In the end of 6 0s nobody would have even imagine the pre-
sent success of the New York Convention.
Werner, supra note 24, at 120.
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